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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Did the Utah Court of Appeals err in affirming the
district court's judgment notwithstanding the verdict, thereby
finding that there was no competent evidence to support the
verdict and that a violation of a statute is negligence per se?
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS
The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 45 states:
Rule 45.

Review of judgments, orders9 and
decrees of Court of Appeals.

Unless otherwise provided by law, the
review of a judgment, an order, and a decree
(herein referred to as "decisions") of the
Court of Appeals shall be intitiated by a
petition for a writ of certiorari to the
Supreme Court of Utah.
The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 46 states;
Rule 46. Considerations governinig review of
certiorari.
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a
matter of right, but of judicial discretio,
and will be granted only for special and
important reasons.
The following, while
neither controlling nor wholly measuring the
Supreme Court's discretion, indicate the
character of reasons that will be considered:
(a)
When a panel of the Court of
Appeals has rendered a decision in
conflict with a decision of another
panel of the Court of Appeals on the
same issue of law;
(b)
Appeals
state or
conflict
Court;

When a panel of the Court of
has decided a question of of
federal law in a way that is in
with a decision of the Supreme

(c)
When a panel of the Court of
Appeals has rendered a decision that has
so far departed from the accepted and
usual course of judicial proceedings or
has so far sanctioned such a departure
by a lower court as to call for an
exercise of the Supreme Court's power of
supervision; or
(d)
When the Court of Appeals has
decided
an
important
question
or
municipal, state, or federal law which
has not been, but should be, settled by
the Supreme Court.
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 50 states:
Rule 50. Motion for a directed verdict and
for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict.
(a) Motion for directed verdict; when
made; effect.
A party who moves for a
directed verdict at the close of the evidence
offered by an opponent may offer evidence in
the event that the motion is not granted,
without having reserved the right so to do
and to the same extent as if the motion had
not been made. A motion for a directed
verdict which is not granted is not a waiver
of trial by jury even though all parties to
the action have moved for directed verdicts.
A motion for a directed verdict shall state
the specific ground[s] therefor. The order of
the court granting a motion for a directed
verdict is effective without any assent of
the jury.
(b) Motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict.
Whenever a motion for a
directed verdict made at the close of all the
evidence is denied or for any reason is not
granted, the court
is deemed to have
submitted the action to the jury subject to a
later determination of the legal questions
raised by the motion. Not later than ten days

2

after entry of judgment, a party who has
moved for a directed verdict may move to have
the verdict and any judgment entered thereon
set aside and to have judgment entered in
accordance with his motion for a directed
verdict; or if a verdict was not returned
such party, within ten days after the jury
has been discharged, may move for judgment in
accordance with his motion for a directed
verdict. A motion for a new trial may be
joined with this motion, or a new trial may
be prayed for in the alternative. If a
verdict was returned the court may allow the
judgment to stand or may reopen the judgment
and either order a new trial or direct the
entry of judgment as if the requested verdict
had been directed. If no verdict was returned
the court may direct the entry of judgment
as if the requested verdict had been directed
or may order a new trial.
(c) Same: Conditional rulings on grant
of motion.
(1) If the motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, provided
for in subdivision (b) of this Rule, is
granted, the court shall also rule on
the motion for a new trial, if any, by
determining whether it should be granted
if the judgment is thereafter vacated or
reversed, and shall specify the grounds
for granting or denying the motion for a
new trial. If the motion for a new trial
is thus conditionally granted, the order
thereon does not affect the finality of
the judgment. In case the motion for a
new trial has been conditionally granted
and the judgment is reversed on appeal,
the new trial shall proceed unless the
appellate court has otherwise ordered.
In case the motion for a new trial has
been
conditionally
denied,
the
respondent on appeal may assert error in
that denial; and if the judgment is
reversed
on
appeal,
subsequent

3

proceedings shall be in accordance with
the order of the appellate court.
(2) The party whose verdict has been
set aside on motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict may serve a
motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule
59 not later than ten days after entry
of the judgment notwithstanding the
verdict.
(d) Same: Denial of motion.
If the
motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict is denied, the party who prevailed on
that motion may, as respondent, assert
grounds entitling him to a new trial in the
event the appellate court concludes that the
trial court erred in denying the motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. If the
appellate court reverses the judgment,
nothing in this Rule precludes it from
determining that the respondent is entitled
to a new trial, or from directing the trial
court to determine whether a new trial shall
be granted.
Section 41-6-73 of the Utah Code
Vehicle
of-way.

turning

left

—

states:
Yield right-

The operator of a vehicle intending to
turn to the left shall yield the right-of-way
to any vehicle approaching from the opposite
direction which is so close to the turning
vehcile as to constitute an immediate hazard.
OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
Rhodes v. Fry, Slip Opinion, Case No. 890473-CA (dated
September 18, 1990).

See Appendix A.
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JURISDICTION
This is a petition for a writ of certiorari to allow
the Utah Supreme Court to review the Utah Court of Appeal's
affirmance,

entered

September

18,

1990,

of

a

judgment

notwithstanding the verdict entered by the Honorable Boyd L.
Parks of the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County, State
of Utah,

The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant to

Section 78-2-2(3) of the Utah Code.

See, Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-

2(3) (1987).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
A.

Nature of the Case.

This is a personal injury

action based upon a two-vehicle accident at an intersection in
Orem, Utah.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below.

This

matter was tried by jury in front of the Honorable Boyd L. Park.
After a trial on disputed facts and disputed expert opinion, the
jury found the Defendant/Appellant, John M. Fry
"Fry"), not negligent.
judgment

Thereafter the trial court entered a

notwithstanding

Plaintiff/Respondent,
"Plaintiff").

(hereinafter

the

Harold

verdict
Edwin

in
Rhodes

favor

of

the

(hereinafter

Fry appealed seeking a reversal of the judgment

notwithstanding the verdict entered by the trial court (in the
face of disputed evidence), and reinstatement of the jury verdict
5
I

in his favor.

The Utah Supreme Court transferred the case to the

Utah Court of Appeals, who affirmed the judgment of the district
court without opinion purusant to Rule 31 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.

See Utah R. App. P. 31.

Fry now petitions

this court for a writ of certiorari.
C.

Statement of Facts.

Note, subsequent to receiving

the briefing schedule by the Court of Appeals, it was determined
that the trial transcript for the second day of trial, November
29, 1988, had not been submitted by the reporter.

The transcript

was received, but the original was not numbered in accordance
with Rule 11(b) of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals.

As a

result, references to that transcript are hereinafter ("TR, pg.

1.

This accident occurred at the intersection of 1300

South and Main Streets in Orem, Utah County, State of Utah on or
about December 11, 1982.
2.

(R-559, pg. 47).

Third-party

"Peterson") was

the

driver

Defendant
of

a

Petersen

(hereinafter

1966 Volkswagen

which was

involved in the collision with a 1979 Chevrolet CIO pickup truck,
driven by Fry.
3.

(TR, pg. 6).
Fry was westbound on 1300 South and intended to

turn left or south.

(TR, pg. 36).

6

4.
by Peterson.
5.

Plaintiff was a passenger in the Volkswagen driven
(TR, pg. 55).
Substantial

evidence existed

that Fry was not

negligent in the subject incident:
a)
intersection, the

Fry

testified

light

turned red.

through the cycle of the light.
b)

that

as he
He

stopped

the

and waited

(TR, pg. 36).

During the time he was stopped at the red

light, he was looking for on-coming traffic.
the exception of a brown station wagon.
c)

approached

He saw none with

(TR, pg. 37)

The brown station wagon was approaching from

the west and was turning left or northbound.

Fry saw no other

headlights or vehicles coming, so he started to make his turn.
(TR, pp. 41, 44).
d)
lane of traffic.

Petersen normally travelled in the left hand
(TR, pg. 19). However, the collision occurred

in the eastbound traffic's far right lane in the intersection.
(R-559, pg. 58).
e)

Shelley Lambert, Fry's passenger, testified

that she was looking for on-coming traffic and saw none.
pg. 41; TR, pp. 109, 110).

7

(TR,

f)

Fry's expert testified that the Volkswagen in

question was obscured from Fry's sight by other traffic.

(R-

497) .
6.

Prior to the impact, Petersen attempted to avoid

the accident by braking.
7.

(R-559, pg. 51).

The experts called by Plaintiff disagreed with

Fry's description of his actions (TR, pg. 36; TR, pg. 156), with
the speed at which Fry proceeded into the intersection, (TR, pg.
39, TR, pg. 157), with the speed at which the Volkswagen was
traveling prior to braking, (R-560, pg. 26; R-560, pg. 36; $-493;
TR, pg. 167), and with the cause of the accident (R-559, pg. 57;
TR, pg. 169; R-497).
8.

Plaintiffs' experts

testified that, based upon

their calculations, Fry was negligent.
169).

(R-559, pg. 57; TR, pg.

Fry's expert testified that, based on his calculations,

Fry was not negligent.
9.
(R-357, 358).

(R-467).

The jury was instructed on the issues of negligence
The court further instructed the jury that the

mere fact that an accident happened does not support an inference
that the defendants, or any party, was negligent.

(R-363).

The

court refused to instruct the jury on unavoidable accident.

(R-

304, 385).
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10.

Petersen made a motion for a directed verdict

which was granted.
11.

(R-387).

Plaintiff made a motion for directed verdict based

upon: the stipulation that Plaintiff, as a passenger in the
Petersen vehicle, was not negligent; the court's ruling as a
matter of law that a case had not been proven against Petersen;
and the court's refusal to instruct the jury on "unavoidable
accident".

(R-292).
12.

The court took Plaintiff's motion for directed

verdict under advisement and submitted the matter to the jury.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Fry when it answered "No"
to the Special Verdict instruction #1 which stated:
1.
At the time and place of the
incident
in question and under the
circumstances as shown by the evidence, was
defendant, John M. Fry, negligent?
Yes

No

X

(R-385).
13.

The

court

subsequently

entered

a

judgment

notwithstanding the verdict in favor of the plaintiff (R-442),
from which Fry appealed.
14.
affirmed

the

See Appendix B.

The Utah Court of Appeals, on a Rule 31 hearing,
judgment

of the district court.

Opinion at 1.
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Rhodes, Slip

ARGUMENT
Fry petitions the Utah Supreme Court for a writ of
certiorari to review various errors the Utah Court of Appeals
made by affirming the judgment notwithstanding the verdict of the
district court.
As

set

forth above, Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of

Appellate Procedure identifies various reasons the Utah Supreme
Court will consider in granting a writ of certiorari.
present

case, the

Court

of

Appeals

rendered

In the

a decision

in

conflict with decisions of the Utah Supreme Court and of other
panels of the Court of Appeals on the same questions of law and
has

sanctioned

a

departure

by

the

district

court

from the

accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings so as to call
for an exercise of the Supreme Court's power of supervision.
The

Findings

of

Fact

and

Conclusions

of

Law

(see

Appendix C ) , made by Judge Park, are unclear as to his basis for
finding Fry negligent as a matter of law.
inferred

from

his

findings of

Two such basis can be

fact and conclusions

of law.

Findings of Fact 6-15 suggest that Judge Park based his decision
on the "fact" that, as a matter of law, Fry violated section 416-73 of the Utah Code and that such a violation was negligence
per

se.

However,

some

of

these

same

findings

of

fact,

particularly findings 11, 12 and 14, and conclusion of law 3,
10

indicating that "reasonable minds could not differ" in finding
Fry negligent suggest that, as a matter of law, no competent
evidence existed to support the verdict in favor of Fry*

Note

that it is unclear whether Judge Park based his finding that
"reasonable minds could not differ" (in finding Fry negligent)
upon the assumption that a violation of the statute is negligence
per se, or upon the "fact" that there was no competent evidence
to support the verdict.

Plaintiff contends that a finding that a

violation of a statute is negligence per se is contrary to Utah
law and that there was competent evidence to support the verdict.
POINT I.
THERE IS COMPETENT EVIDENCE WHICH SUPPORTS
THE VERDICT,
We first address Judge Park's findings, suggested by
his findings of facts and conclusions of law, that there was no
competent evidence to support the verdict.
At the close of Fry's case in chief, the Plaintiff
moved, pursuant to Rule 50 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
for a directed verdict.

The trial court took Plaintiff's motion

for a directed verdict under advisement and submitted the matter
to the jury.

The jury returned a verdict in favor of Fry.

The

court subsequently entered a judgment notwithstanding the verdict
in favor of Plaintiff.

Rule 50(b) states in part:

11

(b) Motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict• Whenever a motion for directed
verdict made at the close of all the evidence
is denied or for any reason is not granted,
the court is deemed to have submitted the
action to the jury subject to a later
determination of the legal questions raised
by the motion. . . .
If a verdict was
returned the court may allow the judgment to
stand or may reopen the judgment and either
order a new trial or direct the entry of
judgment as if the requested verdict had been
directed. . . .
Utah R. Civ. P. 50(b).
The standard

that the trial court must apply when

considering a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict
is set out in Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14 (Utah 1988).

In

that case, the court stated:
The standard to be applied by the trial court
in determining whether to grant a motion for
a j.n.o.v. is stricter than the standard for
deciding to grant a new trial. A j.n.o.v.
can be granted only when the losing party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Id. at 17.

The trial court should grant a motion for judgment

notwithstanding the verdict only if, after viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the non-movant, it finds that no
competent evidence supports the verdict.

In reviewing the trail

court's determination of such issues, the Court of Appeals must
apply the same standard.
(Utah 1987).

King v. Fereday, 739 P.2d 618, 620

In addition to viewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to the non-movant, the court must accord every
12

reasonable inference

fairly drawn from the evidence the same

degree of deference.

Anderson v. Toone, 671 P.2d 170, 172 (Utah

1983) .
In determining whether or not to grant such a motion,
the court is not allowed to weigh the evidence or to determine
which witnesses it feels are the most persuasive or truthful.
The Court of Appeals of Ohio in Cox v. Oliver Machinery Co., 41
Ohio App. 3d 28, 534 N.E.2d 855 (1987) stated:
In ruling on a directed verdict — or, in our
case considering such a ruling on appeal — a
court must construe the evidence most
strongly in favor of the non-moving party and
determine whether reasonable minds can come
but to one conclusion on the evidence
submitted, that conclusion being adverse to
non-moving party.
If reasonable minds can
reach different conclusions, the matter must
be submitted to the jury.
The court
considers the motion without weighing the
evidence or determining the creditability of
witnesses.
A motion for directed verdict
raises a question of law because it examines
the materiality of the evidence rather than
the conclusions to be drawn from the
evidence. Thus, the court does not determine
whether one version of the facts presented is
more persuasive than another; rather, it
determines whether only one result can be
reached under the theories of law presented
in the complaint.
Id. at

, 534 N.E.2d at 857-58 (citations omitted).
As stated in Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Const. Co., 701

P.2d 1078 (Utah 1985), "[wjhere evidence is in conflict in a jury
trial, we assume that the jury believed those facts that support
13

its verdict, and we view the facts and the reasonable inferences
that arise from those facts in a light most supportive of the
jury's verdict."

Id. at 1082 (citations omitted).

Fry's theory of the case was that his view of the
oncoming traffic was obstructed by another vehicle and that his
turning left was reasonable under the existing circumstances.

In

support of this theory, competent evidence was presented by Fry,
supported

by

the

direct

testimony

of

his

passenger

Shelley

Lambert and by the expert testimony of Dr. Rudolf Limpert.
The court's ruling

(R-442), in paragraphs 4 and 5,

illustrates the factual disputes that were presented during the
course of the trial.

Fry testified that while waiting for the

light to turn green, he looked for oncoming traffic.

After the

light turned green, he proceeded into the intersection.

He had

observed an on-coming station wagon which was making a left turn.
He looked for any other on-coming vehicles which would have posed
an immediate hazard and there was none to be seen.

He then

proceeded to make his turn and was struck by the plaintiff's
vehicle.

(See Statement of Facts).
The

passenger

in

Fry's

vehicle,

Shelley

Lambert,

testified that she also saw the station wagon start to make a
left-hand turn.

She did not observe any other vehicles which

14

would pose an immediate hazard.

She was comfortable with Fry

proceeding with his turn (TR, pg. 110).
The

defendant's

expert

witness

testified

that

the

larger vehicle provided an obstruction which prevented Fry from
seeing the Petersen vehicle.

As a result, his opinion was that

Fry's actions were not unreasonable.

(R-497).

In fact, the

trial judge, in his findings of fact, referred to such competent
evidence offered by Fry and Dr. Limpert.

See, Findings of Fact

3, 5.
Thus, the record demonstrates that there was sufficient
material evidence to support the jury's verdict.

The jury found

that the defendant's actions were reasonable and prudent under
the conditions that the jury determined existed at the time of
the accident.

By affirming the trail court's judgment entering

j.n.o.v. in favor of Plaintiff, the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision that was clearly in conflict with decisions of the Utah
Supreme Court and other decisions of the Court of Appeals, and
sanctioned the departure by the trial court from the accepted and
usual

course

of

judicial

proceedings

so

as to call

exercise of the Supreme Court's power of supervision.

15

for an

POINT II.
THE VIOLATION OF A STATUTE IS NOT NEGLIGENCE
PER SE AND THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT, AS
A 2SATTER OF LAW, THE DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT
AND THE ACCIDENT WAS NOT AN UNAVOIDABLE
ACCIDENT.
We now address Judge Park's ruling, suggested by his
findings of fact and conclusions of law, that a violation of the
statute is negligence per se.
In discussing this point, it is critical to avoid being
distracted by the label, "unavoidable accident".

The trial court

became so involved with the term "unavoidable accident" that it
failed to examine the role which such an instruction plays in a
negligence claim.

In Anderton v. Montgomery, 607 P.2d 828 (Utah

1980), the Utah Supreme Court held:
Unavoidable accident, rather than being a
separate legal doctrine, is simply a
recognition of the fact that an incident
causing injury to the plaintiff does not
necessarily give rise to liability in the
defendant.
Where the injury arises from a
set of circumstances which do not reflect a
lack of due care on anyone's part, no
recovery may had under a theory of
negligence, the accident being "unavoidable."
As explained above, a properly drafted
unavoidable accident instruction punctuates
the necessity of finding both negligence and
causation prior to assigning liability.
It
is true that such an instruction amounts, in
essence, to a reemphasis of principles
already implicit in other instructions. . . .
16

Id, at 834.
The court, in finding this was not an

"unavoidable

accident" found as a matter of law, that Fry did not keep a
proper lookout, and that such was a violation of his statutory
duty pursuant to Section 41-6-73 of the Utah Code,
Code Ann. § 41-6-73 (1981) (amended 1988).

See Utah

These findings, along

with the other findings and conclusions by the court, in effect,
hold a violation of this section is negligence per se.
Before addressing the quesiton of whether a violation
of the statute is negligence per se, it must first be pointed out
that the trial court erred in finding, as a matter of law, that
Fry did not keep a proper lookout.
As the Anderson v. Toone court held:
The law is well settled in our jurisdiction
that most cases involving negligence are not
susceptible to summary disposition, finding a
defendant negligent as a matter of law. . . .
Plaintiff reasons that defendant's
failure to keep a proper lookout was
negligence as a matter of law and thus that
issue should not have been submitted to the
jury to be decided. but we have heretofore
held that what constitutes a proper lookout
is a question for the jury as the individual
fact situation in each case does not lend
itself to a rigid application of any rule,
but demands instead a determination of the
conditions as they existed at the time of the
accident (Cite omitted.)
Anderson, 671 P.2d at 172.

17

The Utah Supreme Court previously overturned similar
findings by a trial judge on a claimed failure to maintain a
proper lookout.

In Durrant v. Pelton, 16 Utah 2d 7, 394 P.2d 879

(1964), the court held:
However, the test " [a]s to what constitutes a
proper lookout is usually * * * a latter-day
classic question for jury determination, and
each trial and appellate court must determine
the question as a matter of law only when
convinced that reasonable persons could not
disagree
upon
the
question
when
conscientiously apply fact to l a w " . . . .
A jury should determine what a reasonable and
prudent person would do under the conditions
as they existed at the time of the accident.
Id. at

394 P.2d at 881.
In Smith v. Galleqos, 16 Utah 2d 344, 400 P.2d 570

(Utah 1965), the court addressed the same issue presented in
this appeal.

It held:

Justice does not sanction any such favoring
of one party at the expense of the other. It
imposes upon all drivers, including not only
the left turner, . . . but also upon the
oncoming vehicle . . . the fundamental duty
which pervades the entire law of torts and
from which no one is at any time excused: to
use that degree of care which a reasonable
and prudent person would use under the
circumstances for the safety of himself and
others. . . .
If the left turner in
performing his duty, and in making the
required observation, sees no vehicle
approaching, or that any coming is far enough
away so that he can reasonably believe that
he has time to make his turn, he may
proceed.
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Id. at

, 400 P.2d at 572.
In King v. Fereday, the plaintiff argued that a rear-

end collision constituted a violation of section 41-6-62 Utah
Code and amounted to negligence oer se.

The court held:

Plaintiff's argument therefore assumes that
the fact of the collision alone establishes a
violation of the state. In McCloud v. Baum,
this Court held that a collision alone does
not create an inference of negligence. Id.
at 1127-28.
King, 739 P.2d at 620.
Finally, in Maltbv v. Cox Construction Co., Inc., 598
P.2d

336

(Utah

1979),

the

court

analyzed

plaintiff's

jury

instruction which would have, in effect, directed a verdict in
their favor.

The court held:

This requested instruction is tantamount
to an instruction that rear-end collisions
are invariably the result of the negligence
of the driver of the following vehicle. The
instruction was properly refused. The Court
properly instructed the jury as to the duties
and responsibilities of each of these parties
to keep a proper lookout, to keep their
respective vehicles under proper control,
and to sue such care as a reasonable prudent
person would use under the circumstances.
The jury was persuaded that Pritchard's
actions were reasonable under
these
circumstances, and that plaintiff's were not.
Id. at 340.
In

light

of

the

long

standing

case

law

in

Utah

spelling out the jury's role to determine what constitutes issues
19

of negligence, the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial
court's

finding that Fry

"did not keep a proper lookout for

eastbound on-coming traffic. "
It was

also

improper

for the Court

of Appeals to

sanction the trial court's implicit holding that a violation of a
statute is negligence per se.
conflict with Utah case.

Such a holding is in direct

As stated in Intermountain Farmers

Ass'n v. Fitzgerald, 574 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1978).
[T]he violation of a statute does not
necessarily constitute negligence per se and
may be considered only as evidence of
negligence . . . .
[The violation] may be
regarded as "prima facie evidence of
negligence, but is subject to justification
or exuse . . . ."
Id. at 1164-65 (quoting Thompson v. Ford Motor Co., 16 Utah 2d
30, 395 P.2d 62, 64 (1964)) (emphasis added).
Thus, the Utah Court of Appeals committed error by
affirming the district court's finding that as a matter of law
Fry violated the statute and that such a violation was negligence
per se.
CONCLUSION
Based on the authorities and discussion above, this
court

shold

grant

a writ

of

certiorari

for the purpose of

reviewing the errors made by the Utah Code of Appeals (and the
district court).
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
OOOOO

Harold Edwin (Hal) Rhodes,
P l a i n t i f f and Appellee,

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE
Case No. 890473-CA

John M. Fry and Judith
L. Fry,
Defendants, Third-Party
P l a i n t i f f s and A p p e l l a n t s ,
v.
William C. Petersen,
Third-Party Defendant
and Appellee.
Before Judges Greenwood, Jackson and Bench (On Rule 31 Hearing).

The judgment of the district court is affirmed,
DATED this /7?>^ dav of September, 1990.
ALL CONCUR:
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Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

Norman H. Jackson, Judge

Russell W. Bench, Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 18th day of September, 1990, a
true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE was
deposited in the United States mail.
Scott W. Christensen
Hanson, Epperson & Smith
Attorneys at Law
4 Triad Center, Suite 500
P.O. Box 2970
Salt Lake City, UT 84180
Fred D. Howard
Leslie We Slaugh
Howard, Lewis & Petersen
Attorneys at Law
120 East 300 North St.
Provo, UT 84603
Ray Phillips Ivie
Ivie & Young
Attorney for Petersen
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Fourth District Judge
101 County Building
Provo, UT 84601
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FRED D. HOWARD (1547), for
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801)373-6345
Facsimile: (802) 377-4991

Q:Rhod-iud.lo
Our File No. 14,608

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
HAROLD EDWIN (HAL) RHODES,
Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT

vs.

JOHN M. FRY and JUDITH L. FRY,
Defendants and
Third-Party Plaintiffs,
Civil No. 64,555

vs.

WILLIAM C PETERSEN,
Judge Boyd L. Park
Third-Party Defendant.
This matter having come on regularly for hearing before the Court sitting with
a jury on November 28-30, 1988, and the Court having heard the Motion of plain tiffs
counsel for a directed verdict and having granted the same by reason of the evidence
presented, and the jury having heretofore resolved the question of damages regarding
plaintiff's injuries herein, and after good faith presentation of the evidence by both
plaintiff and defendant, being fully advised in the premises, and having heretofore

entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law; the Court does now make and
enter the following Judgment against defendants John M Fry and Judith L. Fry:
JUDGMENT
The Court concludes that plaintiff is entitled to a judgment against defendants
John M. Fry and Judith L. Fry in the amount of 521,000.00 for special damages,
together with accrued interest on said special damages from the date of the subject
accident, December 11, 1982, until the date of judgment, at the rate of eight percent
(8%), and for general damages in the amount of 529,000.00, with interest to accrue on
the total judgment at the rate of twelve percent per annum (12%), plus court costs
thereafter.

/

DATED this . / l day of

fit*'-/

. 1989.
BY THE COURT

BOYtf L. PARK
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to
the following, postage prepaid, this
Scott W. Christensen, Esq.
Hansoa, Epperson & Smith
P. O. Box 2970
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2970

day of

. 1989.
R. Phil Ivie, Esq.
Ivie & Young
P. O. Box 672
Provo, UT 84603
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FRED D. HOWARD (1547), for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
12Q East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-6345
Facsimile: (802) 377-4991

Q:Rhod-FOF.lo
Our File No. 14,508

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

HAROLD EDWIN (HAL) RHODES,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.

JOHN M. FRY and JUDITH L. FRY,
Defendants and
Third-Party Plaintiffs,
Civil No. 64,555

vs.

WILLIAM C. PETERSEN,
Judge Boyd L. Park
Third-Party Defendant.

This matter having come on regularly for hearing before the Court sitting with
a jury on November 28-30, 1988, and after a good faith presentation of the available
evidence by both the plaintiff and the defendants; and the Court having heard the
Motion of plaintiffs counsel for a directed verdict and having thereafter received
memoranda of points and authorities by the respective attorneys in support of and in

opposition to said Motion, and the jury having heretofore resolved the question of
damages regarding plaintiff's injuries herein, and the Court having taken said Motion
under advisement, and thereafter having heard oral arguments regarding said Motion,
and being fully advised in the premises, the Court concludes that all the evidence
showed defendant William C. Peterson was not negligent and that John M. Fry was
negligent; and does, therefore, grant PlaintifFs Motion for Directed .Verdict; and it
does now make and enter the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On or about December 11, 1982, the defendant John M. Fry was driving

a 1979 Chevrolet CIO pickup truck which was involved in a collision with a 1966 twodoor Volkswagen driven by third-party defendant William C. Petersen.

The accident

occurred at the intersection of State Road 265 and Main Street in Orem, Utah at
approximately 6:22 p.m. The intersection was regulated by traffic lights.
2.

The plaintiff Harold Edwin Rhodes was a passenger in the vehicle driven

by third-party defendant William C. Petersen.

Upon impact, the occupants of the

Petersen vehicle were all rendered unconscious from the accident and have limited
memory of the circumstances occurring at the time of the accident.
3.

Prior to the collision, the Fry vehicle was traveling westbound on State

Road 265, and the Petersen vehicle was travelling eastbound. Defendant Fry testified
that he brought his vehicle to a stop at the intersection while he faced a red light.
When the light turned green, he perceived a station wagon approaching that was going
to make a left turn.

Defendant Fry stated he did not see the Petersen vehicle and,

therefore, proceeded to turn to the left across the eastbound lane of travel of the
2

Petersen vehicle. In an attempt to avoid defendant Fry's vehicle as it turned in front
of Petersen's vehicle, Petersen applied the brakes and his vehicle laid down 35 feet 11
inches of tire skid marks before the point of impact between the two vehicles. (See
Exhibits 2 and 10.)
4.

The Court finds from the testimonies of the investigating officer, Fran

Fillmore, and accident ^constructionists, Newell Knight and Greg DuVal, that defendant Fry was negligent.
5.

John M. Fry's expert accident reconstructionist, Rudolph Limpert, stated

on direct examination when asked: "Based on your experience in accident investigation
and reconstruction, what caused this accident?":
A set of unfortunate circumstances, a vehicle driving
behind a station wagon, a large domestic or American
station wagon that's some distance behind. One could
calculate how small that Volkswagen is in relationship to
the perspective of that big car, the station wagon
obstructing its view. And then the unfortunate accident
"occurred. So I*'don't see anything unreasonable in terms
of the left turn by Mr. Fry when he made the left turn.
(Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings* Testimony of Rudolph Limpert, November 29,
1988, 2:10 p.m. transcribed p. 30.)
6.

The Court notes that the jury by Special Verdict found defendant John

M. Fry not negligent.

The jury finding, together with the Court's instruction to the

jury, that the plaintiff was not negligent as stipulated by the parties and further, that
the Court had found as a matter of law defendant Petersen was not negligent, resulted
in what would have to be termed an unavoidable accident. The Court had refused to

3

give an unavoidable accident instruction. The jury further found plaintiff Harold E.
Rhodes incurred 521,000.00 in special damages and 529,000.00 in general damages.
7.

Utah Code Ann., § 41-6-73, which was submitted as Jury Instruction No.

23, states:
The operator of a vehicle intending to turn to the left
shall yield the right-of-way to any vehicle approaching
from the opposite direction which is so close to the
turning vehicle as to constitute an immediate hazard.
8.

This Court finds that Utah Code Ann., § 41-6-73, is applicable to the

case at bar and creates a statutory duty on all operators of motor vehicles who make
left hand turns to *. . . yield the right-of-way to any vehicle approaching from the
opposite direction which is so close to the turning vehicle as to constitute an immediate hazard."
9.

This Court also follows the ruling in French v. Utah Oil Ref. Co.. 117

Utah 406, 216 P.2d 1002, 1004 (1950) wherein the Utah Supreme Court held:
. . . a burden is placed on the driving making the turn as
he has control of the situation, and if there is a reasonable probability that the movement cannot be made in
safety then the disfavored driver should yield. The driver
proceeding straight ahead has little opportunity to know a
vehicle is to be turned across his path until the movement
is commenced and in many instances, the warning is too
late for the latter driver to take effective action.
10.

The Court also adheres to the rationale of Yeatcs v. Budge. 122 Utah

518, 252 P.2d 220 (1953) wherein the Utah Supreme Court held that where a defendant
attempted to turn across the path of the plaintiff, when he was only 40 feet away, the
trial court could reasonably conclude that the plaintiff was so close as to constitute an
4

immediate hazard and that the defendant should have yielded the right-of-way to him.
11.

This Court is reluctant to take from the jury its fact finding respon-

sibility regarding negligence of the parties and whether the negligence was a proximate
cause of plaintiff's injuries. The Court is mindful of those cases in which the Supreme
Court has concluded that juries should be fact finders. (Mel Hardman Productions. Inc.
v. Robinson. 604 P.2d 913, 917 (Utah 1979).)
12.

The Court, however, given all the testimony of the witnesses, finds that

the matter is one in which reasonable minds could not differ, and in fairness and
equity, cannot find that this accident was an unavoidable accident. The Utah Supreme
Court has defined an unavoidable accident as ". . . an unusual and unexpected occurrence 'which result[sj in injury and which happenfs] without anyone failing to exercise
reasonable care . . ." (Kusv v. K-Mart Apparel Fashion Corporation. 681 P.2d 1232, 1237
(Utah 1984); and Stringham v. Broderick. 529 PL2d 425, 426 (Utah 1974).
13.

Even should this Court ignore the testimony of those witnesses who

testified that defendant Fry was negligent and look only to the testimony of Fry's
witness, Rudy Limpert, (according to his calculations this was an unfortunate accident),
this Court is of the opinion that the accident was not an unavoidable accident as
defined by the Supreme Court of this state.
14.

The Court finds that given ail the evidence reasonable men could not

differ in finding that the defendant John M. Fry made a left hand turn across oncoming traffic heading eastbound along State Road 265 and did not keep a proper
lookout for eastbound on-coming traffic which resulted in his colliding with third-party
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defendant William C. Petersen's vehicle, thus violating his statutory duty pursuant to
Utah Code Ann., § 41-6-73.
15.

The Court also finds that the jury was confused in its application of the

jury instructions to the facts of the case by essentially concluding the collision to be
an unavoidable accident.
16.

The Court further finds that plaintiff Harold Edwin Rhodes is entitled to

his directed verdict against defendants holding that defendant John M. Fry negligently
operated his vehicle which was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries.
17.

The Court finds that at the time of the accident, December 11, 1982,

John M. Fry was the operator of a vehicle as a minor under 18 years of age; and this
his mother, Judith L. Fry, signed John M Fry's driver's license application.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and enters the
following:
CONCLUSIONS-OFEAW
1.

The Court concludes that the plaintiff Harold Edwin (Hal) Rhodes was

not negligent.
2.

The Court concludes that the third-party defendant William C. Petersen

was not negligent.
3.

The Court concludes that reasonable minds could not differ regarding the

liability of the defendant and third-party plaintiff John M. Fry and concludes the same
to be negligent and that said negligence was the proximate cause of the accident in
question and of plaintiff's injuries.
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4.

The Court concludes that by law, liability of John M Fry is imputed to

defendant and third-party plaintifff Judity L. Fry under Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-115(2).
5.

The Court concludes that plaintiff is entitled to a judgment against

defendants John M. Fry and Judith I- Fry in the amount of S21,000.00 for special
damages, together with accrued interest on said special damages from the date of the
subject accident, December 11, 1982, until the date of judgment, at the rate of eight
percent (8%), and for general damages in the amount of 529,000.00, with interest to
accrue on the total judgment at the rate of twelve percent per annum (12%), plus court
costs thereafter.
DATED this _ /

day of Aprf£ 1989.
BY THE COURT
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BOYD L. PARK
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to
the following, postage prepaid, this

T day of April, 1989.

Scott W. Christensen, Esq.
Hanson, Epperson & Smith
P. O. Box 2970
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2970

R. Phil Ivie, Esq.
Ivie & Young
P. O. Box 672
Provo, UT 84603

^h(WfltjJ)
SECRETARY

7

C/h/jO^/^^

